India’s Role in the Indo-Pacific: Steering US Primacy and Regional Dynamics
Volume 1, Issue 1, Pages 1-20
Abstract
This article examines India’s evolving role in the Indo-Pacific as a pivotal actor navigating the involved interaction between United States primacy, China’s rising influence, and the broader dynamics of regional transformation. It argues that India is neither a passive participant in a US-led security architecture nor a subordinate alliance partner, but rather an autonomous strategic actor seeking to shape a multipolar Indo-Pacific order through a combination of strategic autonomy, selective alignment, and inclusive regionalism. The Indo-Pacific, as a geopolitical construct, has emerged as the central arena of 21st-century power competition, characterised by maritime rivalry, contested trade routes, technological competition, and shifting institutional frameworks. The article situates India’s Indo-Pacific strategy within the broader context of maritime security, geo-economic interdependence, and non-traditional security challenges. It highlights India’s role in shaping regional architecture through initiatives such as SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region), the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI), and active participation in minilateral frameworks, including the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). While India cooperates with the United States in maintaining a free, open, and rules-based Indo-Pacific, it simultaneously preserves strategic autonomy by maintaining diversified partnerships with Russia, West Asia, and ASEAN countries.A key contribution of the article is its integration of migration governance into Indo-Pacific geopolitics. It demonstrates how labour mobility, diaspora networks, and climate-induced displacement have become central to regional stability and economic interdependence. Migration is conceptualised not only as a socio-economic phenomenon but also as a strategic factor linked to climate vulnerability, maritime insecurity, and geopolitical competition.
The article further analyses China’s extractive economic model and the United States’ efforts to sustain regional primacy, situating India as a balancing and norm-shaping power within this contested environment. It concludes that India’s Indo-Pacific vision is anchored in inclusive multilateralism, maritime cooperation, and human security, positioning India as a central actor in shaping a stable, resilient, and multipolar Indo-Pacific order.
Keywords
Geopolitics, Indo-Pacific, Maritime Security, US primacy, India’s centrality, Quad.
Open Access
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Introduction
This article argues that India is neither a subordinate pillar of US primacy nor a passive regional actor; rather, it is emerging as an autonomous Indo-Pacific power attempting to shape a multipolar regional order while selectively converging with US strategic objectives. The Indo-Pacific is a maritime construct reflecting geopolitical realities, encompassing the region between the west coast of the United States and the east coast of Africa. The term ‘Indo-Pacific’ signifies a strategic shift from the Asia-Pacific, which primarily referred to the Southeast Asian Pacific and highlighted China’s dominance in the South China Sea, including the strategic Malacca Dilemma associated with its interests. Historically, this region aligns with the ancient maritime Silk Road, a trade route connecting China to the Roman Empire and the West. For centuries, the seas have served as conduits for human interaction, trade, civilisations, and rivalries. The ancient Silk Road extended into the Asia-Pacific, indicating an eastward shift before evolving into a regional strategic hotspot, known as the Indo-Pacific. This expansive region integrates the Indian Ocean, the Pacific Ocean, and the surrounding land masses.
The term’s usage dates back to 1920, when Karl Haushofer introduced it in his ‘Pan-Regions Theory’. However, a more inclusive interpretation emerged from former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s 2007 address to the Indian Parliament, where he described the Indo-Pacific as a ‘Confluence of Two Seas’ (Abe 2007) Abe emphasised that “the Pacific and Indian Oceans are dynamically coupling as seas of freedom and prosperity,” and envisioned a “broader Asia” that transcends traditional geographical boundaries to form a distinct entity. Abe highlighted the joint responsibility of countries in the region to expand and enrich these seas to maintain their transparency and freedom. The Indo-Pacific region is home to 65% of the world’s population, contributes 62% of the global GDP, and accounts for 46% of the world’s merchandise trade. It encompasses 65% of the world’s oceans and 25% of the land area. Additionally, 70% of the world’s natural disasters occur in this region, underscoring its environmental significance for sustainable development. The Indo-Pacific encompasses the world’s most critical Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs), with key chokepoints such as the Mozambique Channel, Bab-el-Mandeb, the Malacca Strait, and the Cape of Good Hope, all of which are vital for securing trade flows and shaping new power dynamics. Its vastness is further complemented by abundant natural marine resources, polymetallic nodules, and offshore hydrocarbons, attracting competing interests from states seeking to exploit these resources for strategic advantages. This region contains nine of the world’s ten busiest seaports, with one-third of global maritime trade passing through the South China Sea alone.
Geopolitical developments in the Indo-Pacific, coupled with the rise of non-traditional threats such as piracy, trafficking, terrorism, illegal fishing, and severe environmental disasters, are driving militarisation and confrontations. This article explores the feasibility and urgency of establishing India-centric, rule-based institutions and initiatives to foster a democratic, free, open, and interconnected Indo-Pacific region. Indian policymakers and scholars recognise that the ‘Indo’ part of the Indo-Pacific underscores India’s role as a regional ‘net security provider.’ Reflecting this strategic shift, the United States renamed its Pacific Command as the Indo-Pacific Command. This region is increasingly characterised by two complementary developments: the US–China confrontation marked by economic rivalry and political manoeuvring, and deepening complex economic interdependence among regional states. China’s growing assertiveness and expansion through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) have challenged the strategic interests of both regional powers and the United States, contributing to an evolving power transition that raises important questions regarding the role of great powers in building a stable security architecture. China’s growing capabilities and influence have prompted global scrutiny of the uncertainties in the Indo-Pacific region, highlighting the significant power transitions reshaping the regional balance. In this context, India’s centrality can provide a potential strategic response to this zero-sum game, offering a path towards greater stability, cooperation, and inclusive regional governance in the Indo-Pacific.
2. Theoretical Understanding
According to Alfred Thayer Mahan, “Whoever rules the waves rules the world” (Mahan 2022). He postulated his theory of sea power through his study of Great Britain’s command of the seas. Mahan asserted that Britain’s emergence as the world’s political, military, and economic power was closely linked to the corresponding decline in the naval strength of its rivals, signifying the importance of sea power in the global order. International relations are an interplay of national interests, which sometimes give rise to confrontation within an inherently anarchic international system. Strategic conflicts are a result of realist tendencies which emphasises the conflicting nature of the actors for the expansion of their power, as argued by Offensive Realism (John Mearsheimer), or for enhancing their security, as proposed by Defensive Realism (Kenneth Waltz). In the current geopolitical environment, the Indo-Pacific region is witnessing the effects of the Russia–Ukraine war, China’s economic and strategic expansion through the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’, conflicts in the Middle East, continued US primacy, increasing militarisation, and an ascendence of non-traditional security threats.
Moreover, Social Constructivism coupled with realism givesrise to new power competitions in a multidimensional context where regional powers have jurisdiction (Exclusive Economic Zone) over strategically located Hotpoint, combining with important maritime resources. Analysing these confrontations from the social constructivists’ perspective, there is an imminent requirement for cooperation using various mechanisms (regional cooperation, strategic alignment, 2+2 meetings, and Track II diplomacy).
Moreover, the Indo-Pacific represents a complex arena of competingstrategic interests, perfectly qualifying for a practical application of Game Theory. The USA emerged as a global superpower after the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War, asserting its power in the form of ‘American Hegemony’. So far, there has emerged no single great power to confront or challenge the hegemonic position of the USA in the world sphere. Further, the international institutional mechanisms are somewhat inclined towards America’s principles and interests. However, rule-based order also reflects Westernideals and ideas advocating a democratic setup and systems agreed upon by consensus between the sovereign state, but hegemony still existed. Thereafter, China’s rise in the Indo-Pacific is recognisedby the US as an assertion of itsaggressive expansionist policies to dominate the critical point of geopolitics. This led to confrontation between both parties as the USA wants to secure its hegemonic position and geostrategic positioning byassuming primacy in the region along with strategic regional alignment. On the other hand, China wants to exert its position through infrastructure development, military, and commercial expansion of its naval capabilities, termed as ‘String of Pearls’ by the US researchers in 2004. The US, on the other hand, is involved in internal and external balancing, leading to a zero-sum game.
The Indo-Pacific region shows trends towards neo-colonialism due to two congruent developments. Firstly, China’s economic muscle flexing via infrastructure diplomacy under the ambit of the BRI is plunging countries into a debt trap, thereby securing control over their sovereign territories. Secondly, US primacy while confronting China is keen on the formation of a security architecture leading to military grouping and escalation of disputes. As a result, regional countries thatearlier were dependent on alignment with the superior powers through informal institutions are exploring the possibilities of regional cooperation. In the absence of any institutional formal structure, alignment is often sought as a viable resort. However, it is not a mechanism to achieve a rule-based security architecture on defined objectives. Realisingthe strategic importance of the region, littoral countries are banking on the regional leadership exploring the possibilities of regional integration in the form of bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral institutions or groupings.
India’s Strategic Autonomy and Multipolar Indo-Pacific
India’s engagement with the Indo-Pacific cannot be understood solely through the lens of balancing China or supporting the United States-led regional order. Rather, India’s Indo-Pacific strategy is deeply rooted in the principle of strategic autonomy, which has historically shaped Indian foreign policy since the era of Non-Alignment. Although the geopolitical environment of the 21st century differs substantially from the bipolar Cold War framework, India continues to resist formal alliance politics and instead advocates a multidimensional approach often described as “multi-alignment.” This strategy enables India to engage simultaneously with competing powers while safeguarding its sovereign decision-making capacity.
India’s strategic autonomy reflects its aspiration to emerge as an independent pole within an evolving multipolar international order. Unlike treaty-bound alliances such as NATO, India’s partnerships are issue-based, flexible, and guided by national interests rather than bloc politics. In the Indo-Pacific, this approach allows India to cooperate closely with the United States and the Quad on maritime security and regional stability while simultaneously maintaining historical ties with Russia, strategic connectivity projects with Iran, and growing economic engagements with Gulf countries. Such diplomatic flexibility enables India to avoid excessive dependence on any single power centre.
The rise of China and the intensification of Sino-US competition have further elevated India’s strategic significance within the Indo-Pacific architecture. However, India does not perceive itself merely as a subordinate actor facilitating American primacy in Asia. Instead, New Delhi seeks to shape the regional order through a balancing strategy that supports a rules-based framework while opposing hegemonic domination by any single power. India’s participation in mechanisms such as the Quad demonstrates selective convergence with US strategic objectives, particularly concerning maritime security, supply chain resilience, and freedom of navigation. Nevertheless, India continues to resist transforming the Quad into a military alliance directed exclusively against China.
India’s strategic autonomy was also visible during the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Despite increasing strategic proximity with the West, India refrained from joining Western sanctions against Russia and continued importing Russian energy and defence equipment. This position reflected India’s long-standing defence dependence on Moscow, as well as its broader commitment to maintaining independent foreign policy choices. Simultaneously, the United States displayed strategic accommodation towards India, recognising its pivotal role in balancing China within the Indo-Pacific region (U.S. Agency for International Development 2022). This demonstrates that India’s value to the US-led Indo-Pacific strategy lies not in alliance conformity but in its capacity to function as an autonomous balancing power.
Furthermore, India’s Indo-Pacific vision differs significantly from both Chinese hierarchical regionalism and traditional American hegemony. India advocates an inclusive and multipolar Indo-Pacific where ASEAN centrality, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and rule-based governance remain fundamental principles. Through initiatives such as SAGAR, IPOI, and minilateral frameworks, India attempts to institutionalise cooperation without imposing coercive geopolitical structures. Therefore, India’s strategic autonomy represents not isolationism, but rather an effort to shape a stable Indo-Pacific order through flexible partnerships, regional inclusivity, and sovereign equality. Table 1 presents major ‘hotspots’ and conflict analysis in the Indo-Pacific region.
| Hotspots | Conflict or Threat Analysis |
|---|---|
| South China Sea |
|
| East China Sea |
|
| Somalia and Gulf of Aden |
|
| Persian Gulf |
|
Table 2 shows major challenges that confront the Indo-Pacific region, giving their analyses.
| Challenges | Impact or Description |
|---|---|
| Piracy | Maritime piracy costs up to $16 billion a year according to the International Maritime Bureau. (Asariotis et al. 2014) |
| Maritime Terrorism | Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups like Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiyah |
| Trafficking in Arms | Rise in arms trafficking due to the presence of terrorist groups, and strategic rivalry amongst countries for their geostrategic interests, thereby leading to militarisationof the region. |
| Smuggling of Drugs and illegal substances | Pacific Drug Highway for illicit drug production, consumption, and distribution as the region is complementedby the Golden Crescent as well as Golden Triangle. |
| Human Trafficking | The Asia Pacific region constitutes 56% of global human trafficking victims, according to the United Nations. |
| IUU Fishing | Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing posesa grave threat to food security and marine biology. IUU Fishing Index (2021) ranked China as a regular offender contributing to 80-85% of illegal fighting in Indo-Pacific. |
| Marine environment degradation | Climate change, sea level rise, global warming, rise in natural disasters, loss of biodiversity, environment degradation due to militarization and maritime disputes. |
Strategic Interests and Partnerships
Act East Policy: India’s Act East Policy, aimed at strengthening ties with Southeast Asian nations, aligns with the U.S. strategy of a free and open Indo-Pacific. This policy enhances India’s engagement with ASEAN and other regional frameworks, thereby contributing to regional stability.
Quad Alliance: India is a key member of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), along with the United States, Japan, and Australia. The Quad aims to ensure a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific, countering China’s assertive policies in the region.
Defenceand Security Cooperation: India has increased defencecooperation with the U.S. through joint military exercises like Malabar, defenceagreements such as the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), and other strategic initiatives.
Economic and Diplomatic Engagement
Trade and Investment: India actively promotes trade and investment within the Indo-Pacific, including initiatives like the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). The U.S.-India Strategic Partnership also focuses on economic ties, bolstering the region’s economic architecture.
Maritime Security: India plays a crucial role in ensuring maritime security in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). This includes anti-piracy operations, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and collaboration with the U.S. on maritime domain awareness.
Balancing Relations with Other Powers
China: India’s relations with China are complex, involving both cooperation and competition. Though economic ties remain significant, territorial disputes and China’s BRI pose challenges. India’s strategic alliances, such as with the U.S. and other Quad members, are partly aimed at counterbalancing China’s growing influence.
Russia: India maintains a historical and strategic partnership with Russia, particularly in the defence sector. However, India’s growing alignment with the U.S. in the Indo-Pacific creates a delicate balancing act.
ASEAN and Other Regional Players: India engages with ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations)countries and other regional players like Japan and Australia to strengthen regional security and economic integration, thus contributing to a multipolar Indo-Pacific.
Challenges and Future Prospects
Navigating Great Power Rivalry: India’s role involves navigating the rivalry between the U.S. and China while maintaining strategic autonomy. This requires maintaining a delicate balance of engaging with both powers without alienating either power.
Regional Stability: India’s ability to contribute to regional stability will depend on its economic growth, military modernization, and diplomatic initiatives. Effective engagement in regional multilateral forums will also be crucial.
Internal Challenges: Domestic issues, such as economic reforms, infrastructure development, and political stability, will influence India’s capacity to project power and influence in the Indo-Pacific.
3. China’s Extractive Model
The 21st Century is defined by the rise of China in economic, military, diplomatic, and technological spheres. However, China keeps on establishing its control over the Indo-Pacific region, inviting contestation from regional as well as foreign powers. China’s leadership undermines the defined international norms, aspiring to violate structures for its strategic interests. It keeps on militarisingthe South China Sea, placing paramilitary forces on disputed Spratly, Paracel, and other maritime disputed territories along the Nine-Dash line. Further, the development of artificial islands is intended to enhance Chinese control over the resources. Furthermore, it has increased patrols over the region to check any challenge to its influence. These steps are a challenge to the free, open, and rule-based Indo-Pacific, undermining the sovereignty of the nation, thereby disturbing regional stability.
Beijing is using its economic power via inducements, penalties, and influence to force states to comply with its vision. For instance, China is developing infrastructure at a highly inflated price with its own labourersworldwide under the guise of the Belt and Road Initiative. The Belt and Road Initiative aims to connect the Asia-Pacific economic circle with the European economic circle. It intends to establish a community of common interest, common responsibility, and common destiny via policy coordination, infrastructure connectivity, trade and monetary circulations, and people-to-people exchange. China claims it to be purely an economic cooperation initiative rather than an attempt to seek a sphere of influence. However, it is marked by Chinese legacy, constituting Chinese features, Chinese styles, and Chinese confidence. For instance, a Chinese state-owned enterprise has taken control of Hambantota Port for 99 years, taking advantage of Sri Lanka’s external debt repayment obligations. Chinese investments created huge trouble for the economies of Sri Lanka, Greece, Myanmar, etc. Further, unsustainable debts, undemocratic functioning, decreased accountability and transparency, restrictions on the market economy, and military expansion are raising questions about China’s role as an influential power in the Indo-Pacific region.
Furthermore, the announcement of ‘Polar Silk Road’ under OBOR and self-proclaimed ‘Near Arctic Status’ in 2018 strengthened its vision. Moreover, China is undermining sovereignty of India via CPEC (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor), which covers the PoK (Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir) stretch, thereby challenging India’s security and interests. China’s model of development is an extractive model, which only focuses oits own interests, even at the cost of crushing other countries economically, giving rise to instability in the region. The extractivemodel based on the ‘Use and Throw’ strategy is a challenge to established international norms and laws. It argues that the international norms are biased towards the West, which is an argument that many developing countries are raising. However, the alternative to such hegemony must be something progressive, sustainable, and inclusive, which is not the case with China. The rise of China has an impact on regional security architecture, preferably garlanding India with a string of pearls through the expansion of its commercial and military presence and calling countries into economic submission under its BRI.
India and China both share historical ties on civilisational and ancient Silk Route lines. India was only the second country in Asia to recognise China in Indo-Pacific. However, their ties are often sceptical when it comes to contestation as they are both dependent as well as apprehensive of each other due to past conflicts. China wants to be a superpower of the new emerging global world, whereas India claims to be an unchallenged leader of the third world. The power rivalry is not limited to land confrontation but has assumed the colour of maritime rivalry. On one hand, China is encircling India via its String of Pearls, on the other, India is deterring Chinese influence through the Diamond Necklace and regional integration (Khurana 2019). China’s repeated hostilities and its arrogance towards international law and the sovereignty of the country portray it in a bad light. Moreover, its claim about the world structures and systems presuming the character of Westernhegemony is somewhat agreed. However, its actions to reform such systems are further delving countries into mountingdebts, suzerainty-like political outlook, and the rise of undemocratic structures, which frustrates the whole purpose of change. On the contrary, Indian engagement is trustworthy as India never tried to portray itself as a superpower and always opted for an inclusive model. Chinese naval bases are disrupting major sea lines of communications for which Indian centrality is a viable solution.
4. Primacy of The United States
United States, after the Cold War emerged as the most influential superpower in the global politics. The triumph of capitalism and globalization made international laws and regulations in line with the developed world’s vision where any challenge to their power is highly discouraged. Moreover, USA has a prime role in influencing events in the distant regions due to its superiority and thereby dependency of nations on it. Further, Indo-Pacific region has strategic advantages in terms of resources, trade, monopoly, biodiversity, and development, etc. which is driving America’s interest in the region. American government has released a dedicated Indo-Pacific strategy in line with its strategic interests. It also has strategic presence in the oceans via naval and military bases, bilateral-trilateral engagement, and through international norms. However, the rise of China and its geopolitical assertiveness is challenging the status of influential power in the region. It has raised many questions on the free, connected, and peaceful Indo-pacific, its security architecture, and US primacy over the region.
First, the US developed itself as a Pacific hegemon, thereafter looking into the Asia-Pacific due to the emergence of Southeast Asia as a developing economies hub. This resulted in the formulation of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation mechanism. Thereafter, the emergence of Indo-Pacific in 2010 during Obama’s administration took place thereby arresting the Chinese growing assertiveness in the Asia-Pacific and bringing India as a balanced power holder in this two-way contestation of economic interests. Geoeconomically, the US is inclinedtowards the economic exchange taking place between the two oceans. In 2020, the two-way trade between US and Indo-Pacific countries was nearly $1.75 trillion and the US is a major service exporter to the region. China is challenging US supremacy both in economic as well as international influence front which is driving US to keep a check on the China led developments, especially OBOR (One Belt One Road) initiative. US has dual relationship with China. On one hand, it wants to strengthen its economic partnership based on economic interests, on the other, it is highly committed to deter Chinese supremacy. It sees China as a challenger to the established international norms, systems, and structures.
Robert Jervis pointed out that the value of primacy is limited bythe development of nuclear weapons via deterrence strategy and international relations are nowadays regulated by international laws. However, Samuel P. Huntington maintained that US primacy is the key towards its welfare, security, and freedom. Though this primacy surely put a bar on hegemonic wars, as there is little scope for going against US. However, this tranquilising effect is the result of overdependence on America for various reasons. It means that the US can do tasks that other states do not contemplate. America’s role was central in Asian Financial Crisis recovery, crisis in the Middle East, humanitarian assistance, and arresting piracy in the maritime domain.
The United States primarily has five objectives with reference to dealing with the Indo-Pacific region: (I) Advancement of a free, open, and interconnected Indo-Pacific; (II) Connection within and beyond the Indo-Pacific region; (III) Regional development and prosperity; (IV) Regional Security; and (V) Building Regional Resilience to transnational threats. Further, the US is keen on regional cooperation, achieving collective capacity to fulfil its long-term strategy of democratic resilience. As a result of such cooperation, a shift towards democratic and sustainable development isin place in the form of ‘Blue Dot Network’, ‘Build Back Better’, etc. America assumes the role of net security provider to Indo-Pacific (U.S. Department of Defense 2019).
US-led security architecture can be an imposition on Asian values, structures, and way of doing things. The US has a history of engaging in conflicts with its own strategic interests, thereby undermining the regional balance of power. Moreover, a multilateral consensus-based democratic architecture should be preferred over a superpower-led hegemonic imposition. While it is perfectly fit to counter China via its commercial and military advancement, economic development, and ideological value, this will lead to the transformation of raw value fabric. Therefore, a focus on trilateral, regional, and multilateral cooperation must be worked out. US primacy in the region can lead to a new social construct transforming identities, disturbing the conventional regional balance of power. The United States is apprehensive of China’s potential to convert unsustainable debt burdens into strategic and military access, thereby taking possession of sovereign assets in the form of collateral. This great game of power may lead to furthering Chinese influence with the gradual erosion of ASEAN in the power posturing. Further, strategic autonomy with tactical compromises raises questions of territoriality and territorial sovereignty.
4.1 Quad, Minilateralism, and Emerging Security Architecture
The emergence of minilateral frameworks in the Indo-Pacific reflects the growing preference for flexible and issue-oriented strategic cooperation over rigid alliance structures. Among these, the Quad, comprising India, the United States, Japan, and Australia, has emerged as one of the most significant strategic mechanisms shaping the contemporary Indo-Pacific discourse. Initially, conceptualisedin 2007, the Quad gained renewed momentum in response to China’s increasing maritime assertiveness, militarisationof the South China Sea, and expansion under the Belt and Road Initiative (Upadhyay 2021).
The Quad is fundamentally different from traditional military alliances such as NATO. Rather than constituting a collective defence arrangement, it operates as a consultative and cooperative framework addressing maritime security, disaster management, supply chain resilience, cybersecurity, emerging technologies, vaccine diplomacy, and infrastructure development. India has consistently emphasisedthat the Quad should remain inclusive, non-militaristic, and committed to a free, open, and rules-based Indo-Pacific. This reflects India’s broader strategic preference for flexible balancing rather than alliance entrapment.
From the American perspective, the Quad serves as a strategic mechanism to preserve regional balance and counter China’s expanding influence. For Washington, India’s participation in the Quad significantly strengthens the legitimacy and strategic depth of Indo-Pacific cooperation. However, India’s engagement with the Quad is driven by a more nuanced calculation. India seeks to leverage the Quad for enhancing its maritime security, technological cooperation, and regional connectivity without formally aligning against China. Consequently, New Delhi continues to avoid language that explicitly frames the Quad as an anti-China military coalition.
The growing importance of minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific also reflects the limitations of existing multilateral institutions in addressing contemporary geopolitical challenges. ASEAN-led mechanisms often struggle to achieve consensus due to diverging national interests among member states, while formal military alliances may escalate strategic tensions (Atanassova-Cornelis 2020). In this context, minilateral groupings provide a pragmatic middle path by enabling like-minded countries to cooperate on specific strategic concerns without establishing rigid institutional commitments.
India’s involvement in various trilateral and minilateral arrangements, such as India-France-Australia, India-Japan-Australia, and India-Australia-Indonesia, further demonstrates its preference for networked regionalism. These platforms focus on maritime cooperation, resilient supply chains, blue economy initiatives, and humanitarian assistance rather than aggressive military posturing. Therefore, India’s approach to Indo-Pacific security architecture reflects a broader effort to institutionalise regional cooperation while avoiding bloc confrontation.
5. Indian Inclusive Model
India lies in the centre of the Indian Ocean, thus advocatinga free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). India’s centrality is a viable solution for regional assertiveness and foreign primacy in the region. India has always recognised Southeast Asia as a crucial part of its Foreign Policy. The moment it adopted a new economic policy, it looked tothe east for cooperation and integration with the launch of the Look East Policy for extending economic and security cooperation. Building upon its success, the Act East Policy was launched in 2014 to diversify the area of mutual engagements. India in 2015 announced an inclusive model for all the stakeholders for engagement in the form of SAGAR (Security and Growth for All). Thereafter, with the launch of Indo-Pacific Ocean Initiative (IPOI) in 2019 during the East Asia Summit in Bangkok, it tried to include its Indo-Pacific partners in a diverse activity around the world, including blue economy, security in sea line of communication, maritime connectivity, maritime domain awareness, disaster management, humanitarian assistance, capacity building, etc. The relevance of Indo-Pacific can be measuredby the fact that MEA (Ministry of External Affairs) has set upa dedicated Indo-Pacific wing, which aims to integrate all the efforts required for a free, open, interconnected, and rule-based Indo-Pacific. Moreover, the success of this wing led to the formation of another Oceania division in 2020.
Now that the Western Indian Ocean Region is also gaining strategic importance due to its placementat the intersection of Asia, Africa, and Europe. India’s ‘Act West’ is in line with the development in the region, especially security concerns regarding important chokepoints or flashpoints viz-a-viz the Gulf of Aden, Bab-el-Mandeb, the Mozambique Channel, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Cape of Good Hope. India is a trustworthy partner of Africa and its Asia Africa Growth Corridor with Japan as a partner aimed at sustainable solutions in the African region with mutual benefits. India has also recognisedthe crucial role of ASEAN in the region, and there has been synergy between the ASEAN Outlook and India’s FOIP vision.
The seven pillars of IPOI are in line with the ASEAN outlook: (I) Capacity Building and Resource Sharing; (II) Disaster Risk Reduction and Management; (III) Maritime Ecology; (IV) Maritime Resources; (V) Maritime Security; (VI) Science, Technology and Academic Cooperation; and (VII) Trade Connectivity and Maritime Transport. IPOI envisages providing an institutional framework for Indo-Pacific, with India as the centreof this framework dealing with the role of rule-maker rather than obeying rules. Further, SAGAR constitutes an Indian vision for collective security, action, maritime engagement, capacity building, and sustainable development.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi while launching SAGAR said, “Our vision for the Indian Ocean Region is rooted in advancing cooperation in our region and to use our capabilities for the benefit of all in our common maritime home”. It can be a game-changer in asserting Indian centrality in the Indo-Pacific realm while countering China’s aggressiveness in the form of the String of Pearls. India is countering these undemocratic actions in the region via its own counter-encirclement strategy called the Diamond Necklace. India'scentrality is the only viable solution for a sustainable FOIP as its actions are based on inclusivity and it holds the capacity to deter both regional and foreign interferences. India is playing on its strength, using infrastructure diplomacy as an assistance measure for the neighbouringcountries as well as extended neighbourhoods, avoiding zero sum game. India also showed its humanitarian approach to cooperation using vaccine diplomacy, leaving the mark of a saviour state and a responsible leader in the regional integration.
Table 3 presents India-led Initiatives in the Indo-Pacific region.
| Initiative | Description |
|---|---|
| Divisions under Ministry of External Affairs |
|
| Project Mausam | Fostering cultural cooperation and exchanges with the help of the Indian Diaspora |
| Regional integration policies |
|
| Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) | Voluntary initiative founded by India bringing navies of the Indian ocean region littoral states together for maritime cooperation and security enhancement. |
| SAGAR (Security and Growth for All) | Inclusive and holistic initiative for securing India’s geopolitical, geostrategic and geoeconomic interests. (2015) |
| Asia-Africa Growth Corridor | Joint initiative launched in 2017 by India and Japan based on four key components. |
| Indo-Pacific Oceans’ Initiative | Regional cooperation architecture on maritime cooperation based on 7 pillars. |
5.1 India and ASEAN
ASEAN forms ancentral and integral part of the Indo-Pacific region, basing its regional cooperation on the foundation of consociationalism. They recognise the role of various stakeholders involved in Indo-Pacific as well as cooperation between them. They reiterated their vision in the ASEAN Outlook which describes Indo-pacific region as free, open, and resilient based on international norms. Their vision is in line with India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative. Further India is a strategic partner of ASEAN. Both seems to deter US primacy and China’s assertiveness in the region. Table 4 summarisesengagement policy of India-ASEAN in Indo-Pacific region.
| Engagement Policy | Description |
|---|---|
| Look East Policy | Fostering economic cooperation among ASEAN countries and countering China's strategic influence. (1991) |
| Act East Policy | Fostering economic as well as security integration with ASEAN as well as East Asian countries. (2014) |
5.2 India and Japan
The concept of Indo-Pacific as a ‘Confluence of Two Seas’ is the birth child of former Japanese PM Shinzo Abe who, while addressing the Indian Parliament pointed towards a convergence of interests between India and Japan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2023). India and Japan in 2015 announced the first joint statement on the Indo-Pacific and the world. Further, in the Japan-India Vision Statement, New Delhi and Tokyo reiterated their commitment toa Free and Open Indo-Pacific and jointly working towards its attainment. Japan, possessing a developed energy sector, is keen on developing a low-carbon LNG hub as an alternative to coal, focusing on the Indo-Pacific region based on renewable energy. Further, facing confrontation from China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, Japan forms the central pillar of India’ spartnership in East Asia. Furthermore, both forms are an integral part of the Quadrilateral Security Alliance, which is a regional minilateral. Moreover, India and Japan'scollaboration is not restricted merely to the region but goes further to the African continent under AAGC (Asia-Africa Growth Corridor), which is a viable and sustainable alternative to China’s BRI.
5.3 India and Australia
Australia released its Defense White Paper in May 2013, acknowledging the Indo-Pacific as the new geopolitical region, thus highlighting a global strategic shift to the Indo-Pacific. Thereafter, both countries constituted a central part of QUAD and the Malabar exercise for regional integration. Further, on 4th June, 2020, India and Australia reiterated their commitment toa Shared Vision for Maritime Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region as a comprehensive strategic partner during their virtual summit (Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2023). They supported each other’s vision of free, open, inclusive, rule-based Indo-Pacific while showing respect for international law (primarily UNCLOS). They are keen on improving the management of the shared oceanic domain, ensuring maritime safety, and security under the ambit of Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI). They predict a bilateral trade rise with the signing of India-Australia Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement (ECTA). They aimed at creating a secure, resilient, and sustainable supply chain mechanism for future. Australia also forms apart of CDRI (Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure).
5.4 India and South Korea
South Korea announced its ‘New Southern Policy’ (NSP) in 2017 after realisingthe geostrategic importance of the Indo-Pacific region to foster deeper economic engagement with ASEAN and India, and diversification of foreign policy (Dhawan 2020). India and South Korea have been special strategic partners since 2015, reflecting synergies between Seoul’s NSP and India’s ActEast Policy. The China dilemma and strategic hedging between the US and China is pushing South Korea to look out for regional partnerships. South Korea in December 2022, announced its Indo-Pacific strategy under the nomenclature, “Strategy for a Free, Peaceful and Prosperous Indo-Pacific”. India and South Korea will be celebrating their 50 years of diplomatic engagement in the year 2023 which marks a new beginning to investigate the scope of further integration.
5.5 India, West Asia, and Indo-Pacific Connectivity
The Indo-Pacific is increasingly expanding beyond its traditional maritime boundaries to include West Asia and the Gulf region as crucial components of regional connectivity, energy security, and strategic competition. India’s growing engagement with West Asia reflects this evolving geopolitical reality, where the Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea, and Middle Eastern maritime corridors form an interconnected strategic continuum. As a result, India’s Indo-Pacific vision is no longer confined to East and Southeast Asia but extends toward the western Indian Ocean and the Gulf region. West Asia occupies a central position in India’s strategic calculations due to energy dependence, diaspora linkages, maritime trade routes, and emerging connectivity initiatives. India imports a substantial portion of its energy requirements from Gulf countries such as the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, making maritime security in the Arabian Sea, Strait of Hormuz, and Bab-el-Mandeb strategically indispensable. Disruptions caused by piracy, regional conflicts, or attacks on shipping routes directly impact India’s economic and energy security.
India’s increasing engagement with Gulf countries has transformed the nature of Indo-Gulf relations from a purely transactional energy partnership into a broader strategic relationship encompassing infrastructure, defence cooperation, digital connectivity, and investment. Mechanisms such as the India-UAE Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) and the emergence of the I2U2 grouping involving India, Israel, the UAE, and the United States signify the growing integration of West Asia within Indo-Pacific geopolitics.
Furthermore, the announcement of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) reflects a major geopolitical and geoeconomic development aimed at enhancing connectivity between South Asia, the Gulf, and Europe. IMEC is widely perceived as a strategic alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative and demonstrates India’s increasing role in shaping transregional economic architecture. Through such initiatives, India seeks to position itself as a central connectivity hub linking the Indo-Pacific with Europe and the Middle East.
The strategic significance of West Asia within the Indo-Pacific has further increased following instability in the Red Sea region and Houthi attacks on maritime shipping. These developments have highlighted the vulnerability of global supply chains and reinforced the importance of cooperative maritime security mechanisms. India has actively participated in naval deployments, evacuation operations, and maritime surveillance activities to ensure secure sea lanes and protect commercial shipping routes.
India’s engagement with West Asia therefore complements its broader Indo-Pacific vision by integrating energy security, connectivity diplomacy, maritime cooperation, and strategic balancing into a unified framework. This expanding western dimension of the Indo-Pacific strengthens India’s aspiration to emerge as a central actor linking the Indian Ocean, Gulf region, and wider Indo-Pacific strategic order.
5.6 Indian centric Trilaterals
Trilaterals are in vogue with context to Indo-Pacific for convergence of objectives seeking regional integration. India being the strategic centre of Indian Ocean is keen on developing a fair and equitable system for the conduct of affairs in Indo-Pacific. Therefore, minilaterals are a viable solution for an effective and consensual decision making thereby leading to institutionalization of the region and balance of power.
India-centric Trilaterals and groupings with their key roles in the Indo Pacific region are described in Table 5.
| Grouping | Description |
|---|---|
| India-Italy-Japan | To create a stable and rule-based international order based on the consent of all the powers in the region and not primarily the supremacy of few. |
| India-France-Australia | To constitute Indo-Pacific as an open, inclusive, rule-based region respecting sovereignty and territorial integrity while assuring rule of law, freedom of navigation, peaceful resolution of disputes under a democratic system. |
| India-Australia-Indonesia | To foster cooperation through maritime diplomacy, maritime law enforcement, and maritime domain awareness. |
| India-Australia-Japan | Launched Supply Chain Resilient Initiative (SCRI) in 2021 |
5.7 Climate Security and Non-Traditional Threats in the Indo-Pacific
The Indo-Pacific region faces an increasing number of non-traditional security threats that transcend conventional military concerns and require collective regional responses. Climate change, rising sea levels, marine degradation, humanitarian crises, natural disasters, illegal fishing, and climate-induced displacement are emerging as central challenges affecting regional stability and sustainable development. Given the region’s vulnerability to cyclones, tsunamis, floods, and environmental degradation, climate security has become an integral component of Indo-Pacific strategic discourse. The Indian Ocean region is particularly susceptible to climate-related vulnerabilities due to its dense coastal populations and dependence on maritime resources. Rising sea levels threaten small island developing states and low-lying coastal regions, while increasing ocean temperatures and marine pollution endanger biodiversity and food security. Additionally, the intensification of natural disasters creates significant humanitarian and economic pressures that often exceed the response capacity of individual states. India has increasingly incorporated climate security into its Indo-Pacific framework through initiatives, highlighting the critical role of sustainable development, disaster management, and blue economy cooperation (Tuan 2020). Under SAGAR and IPOI initiatives, India advocates collaborative approaches to maritime ecology, disaster risk reduction, and humanitarian assistance. India’s role during regional humanitarian crises, including disaster relief operations and vaccine diplomacy during the COVID-19 pandemic, has strengthened its image as a responsible regional actor. Climate-induced migration and resource competition may also intensify geopolitical tensions within the Indo-Pacific. Coastal erosion, water scarcity, and declining fish stocks can exacerbate socio-economic instability and contribute to irregular migration patterns. Therefore, ensuring regional resilience requires integrating environmental sustainability with maritime governance and regional security architecture. Furthermore, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing has emerged as a major challenge in the Indo-Pacific, threatening food security and marine ecosystems. China’s large-scale fishing operations in contested maritime zones have generated tensions among regional countries and reinforced demands for stronger maritime governance mechanisms (Barrett 2017). India has supported cooperative maritime surveillance and information-sharing frameworks to address these challenges. The increasing overlap between traditional and non-traditional security threats demonstrates that the Indo-Pacific cannot be understood solely through the lens of great power rivalry. Sustainable regional order requires balancing strategic competition with cooperative approaches towards climate governance, humanitarian assistance, disaster resilience, and ecological sustainability. India’s emphasis on inclusivity and collective security provides an alternative framework capable of addressing these multidimensional challenges in the Indo-Pacific region.
5.8 Migration, Mobility, and the Geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific
The Indo-Pacific region is not only a maritime and strategic theatre of great power competition but also a deeply interconnected space shaped by complex patterns of human mobility. Migration, both voluntary and forced, has become an increasingly significant dimension of Indo-Pacific geopolitics, linking questions of labour markets, climate vulnerability, maritime insecurity, and regional economic interdependence. In this context, migration should not be understood merely as a demographic phenomenon, but as a critical component of regional order-making, influencing both state behaviour and institutional responses across the Indo-Pacific. India occupies a central position in these mobility flows due to its geographical location, demographic scale, and extensive diaspora presence across the Indo-Pacific region and beyond. Indian migration patterns span multiple spatial and functional categories, including skilled migration to advanced economies, labour migration to Gulf Cooperation Council states, and semi-skilled labour mobility across Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean littoral. These migratory flows have generated significant economic linkages through remittances, which in turn reinforce India’s integration into the global and regional economy. However, migration in the Indo-Pacific is not solely an economic phenomenon; it is increasingly shaped by geopolitical instability, climate stressors, and maritime insecurity.
One of the most significant emerging dimensions of migration in the Indo-Pacific is climate-induced displacement. The region is highly vulnerable to environmental degradation, sea-level rise, cyclones, and flooding, particularly in coastal and island states across the Indian Ocean and Pacific regions. Countries such as Bangladesh, the Maldives, Sri Lanka, and several small island developing states face existential risks linked to environmental change. These pressures are already producing patterns of internal displacement and cross-border migration, which are expected to intensify in the coming decades. In this sense, migration is increasingly embedded within the broader framework of climate security, where environmental degradation acts as a “threat multiplier” , thereby affecting regional stability.
India’s Indo-Pacific strategy must therefore be understood as intersecting with climate-related mobility governance. Through its initiatives such as the SAGAR and IPOI, India has gradually incorporated disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, and maritime ecological resilience into its regional outlook. These frameworks implicitly acknowledge that forced migration resulting from climate disasters cannot be separated from maritime governance and regional security architecture. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations conducted by India across the Indian Ocean region further demonstrate its role as a first responder in regional crises, thereby linking mobility governance with strategic influence.
Another important dimension of Indo-Pacific migration is labour mobility, particularly between India and West Asia. The Gulf region, including the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, hosts a substantial Indian diaspora that plays a crucial role in sustaining both regional economies and India’s domestic economy through remittances. This form of structured migration has created long-term socio-economic interdependencies between South Asia and West Asia, effectively linking the Indo-Pacific with the broader geopolitical space of the Middle East. Labour migration in this context is not merely economic; it also carries diplomatic and strategic implications, as migrant welfare, consular protection, and labour reforms increasingly shape bilateral relations between India and Gulf states.
Furthermore, migration flows within the Indo-Pacific are also influenced by geopolitical instability and maritime insecurity. Conflicts in the Red Sea region, piracy in the Gulf of Aden, tensions in the South China Sea, and instability in parts of Southeast Asia contribute to irregular migration patterns and human trafficking networks. These challenges underscore the intersection between maritime security and human mobility. The same sea lanes of communication that facilitate global trade also enable illicit migration flows, trafficking in persons, and transnational criminal activity. Consequently, migration governance in the Indo-Pacific cannot be divorced from maritime security frameworks, naval cooperation, and regional surveillance mechanisms. The role of China further complicates the migration-security nexus in the Indo-Pacific. China’s expanding economic footprint through the Belt and Road Initiative has not only reshaped infrastructure connectivity but has also influenced labour migration patterns across Asia and Africa. Chinese overseas investment projects often involve the deployment of Chinese labour, thereby limiting local employment absorption in host states. In some cases, debt dependency associated with infrastructure financing has also contributed to socio-economic instability, indirectly affecting migration pressures in vulnerable states. Thus, migration becomes embedded within broader debates on economic sovereignty, development models, and regional dependency structures. From a theoretical perspective, migration in the Indo-Pacific can be understood through the lens of “complex interdependence,” where economic, environmental, and security dimensions intersect to produce multidirectional flows of people, goods, and capital. Unlike traditional security paradigms that prioritize territorial defence, contemporary Indo-Pacific dynamics require a more comprehensive understanding of mobility as both a driver and consequence of regional transformation. Migration therefore operates as a bridge between hard security concerns (maritime conflict, territorial disputes) and soft security challenges (climate change, andlabour markets, human development). India’s approach to migration governance in the Indo-Pacific reflects its broader strategic identity as a responsible regional power. By combining developmental assistance, diaspora engagement, and humanitarian diplomacy, India positions itself as a stabilising actor capable of managing mobility-related challenges without coercive frameworks. Indian diaspora communities across the Indo-Pacific further reinforce this role by functioning as economic intermediaries, cultural connectors, and informal diplomatic actors. This “diaspora diplomacy” enhances India’s soft power and strengthens its influence in shaping regional perceptions and partnerships. However, migration in the Indo-Pacific also presents significant challenges for India. Irregular migration flows, human trafficking networks, and the vulnerabilities of migrant workers in conflict-prone regions expose structural weaknesses in regional governance mechanisms. Moreover, the increasing securitisation of migration in some Indo-Pacific states reflects broader anxieties about sovereignty, identity, and economic competition. These dynamics highlight the need for more coordinated regional frameworks that can balance state security concerns with human security imperatives. Yet, migration constitutes a critical yet often under-examined dimension of Indo-Pacific geopolitics. It connects environmental vulnerability, economic interdependence, maritime security, and geopolitical competition into a single analytical framework. For India, migration is both a strategic asset and a governance challenge, reinforcing its centrality in regional dynamics while simultaneously exposing it to transboundary risks. Integrating migration into Indo-Pacific discourse therefore enriches our understanding of regional order by highlighting the human dimension of strategic competition and cooperation. As the Indo-Pacific continues to evolve as a central theatre of global politics, migration governance will increasingly shape the contours of regional stability, development, and strategic alignment in the future global international relations.
6. Conclusion
India has emerged as a responsible and influential actor in the Indo-Pacific, committed to sustaining both the geographic environment and strategic stability of the region. As the geopolitical landscape evolves, India’s role becomes increasingly pivotal in fostering a balanced approach to regional security and economic development. Recognising that international relations must be anchored in international laws agreed upon by sovereign nations, India advocates for rule-based governance as the only viable solution to confrontations in the Indo-Pacific. Through an India-led institutional framework, the nation aims to maintain a delicate balance between deterrence against aggressive actions and fostering cooperative relationships among regional and global stakeholders. India has proactively laid the groundwork for such a democratic framework through a range of initiatives and diplomatic engagements, including monoliteral groupings, as well as bilateral and trilateral partnerships. These efforts are part of a broader strategy to build a cohesive and inclusive Indo-Pacific region. For instance, India’s Act East Policy emphasises stronger economic and strategic ties with Southeast Asian nations, whereas the SAGAR initiative underscores India’s commitment to regional maritime security and development. One of the critical components of India’s strategy involves participating in and promoting multilateral forums such as the Quad which includes the United States, Japan, and Australia. The Quad serves as a platform to address shared security concerns, promote maritime cooperation, and uphold a rules-based international order. Additionally, India’s involvement in the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) reflects its dedication to fostering collaborative solutions for maritime security, disaster management, and sustainable development in the region. India has also strengthened bilateral relations with key Indo-Pacific nations, such as Japan, Australia, and Indonesia, through comprehensive strategic partnerships. These partnerships facilitate a wide array of cooperative activities, from defense collaboration to economic investments and cultural exchanges. For example, India’s collaboration with Japan on infrastructure projects and connectivity initiatives enhances regional trade and economic integration, while joint naval exercises with Australia bolster maritime security capabilities. The emergence of the Indo-Pacific as a strategic concept brings new areas of cooperation and shared interests that align with India’s vision for a free, open, and rules-based region. India’s interpretation of the Indo-Pacific emphasises inclusivity and respect for international norms, advocating for an environment where freedom of navigation, overflight, and unimpeded lawful commerce are upheld. This vision seeks to integrate various regional efforts into a cohesive framework that can effectively address common challenges such as piracy, terrorism, and environmental sustainability. India’s role in the Indo-Pacific extends beyond traditional security concerns to encompass broader geoeconomic and geopolitical dimensions. By championing connectivity projects, trade agreements, and sustainable development initiatives, India aims to create an interconnected Indo-Pacific region where economic growth and strategic stability are mutually reinforcing. India’s emphasis on building resilient infrastructure and enhancing digital connectivity, particularly through partnerships with regional nations, contributes to a more integrated and prosperous Indo-Pacific.
Furthermore, India’s approach to the Indo-Pacific underscores the importance of inclusivity, ensuring that the interests of smaller nations and island states are also represented and protected. By advocating for equitable participation in regional decision-making processes, India aims to prevent the dominance of any single power and to promote a multipolar and balanced regional order. In conclusion, India’s emergence as a responsible actor in the Indo-Pacific is characterised by its commitment to a democratic and inclusive framework that balances deterrence with cooperation. Thus, through a delicate combination of multilateral engagements, strategic partnerships, and rule-based initiatives, India seeks to shape a stable, prosperous, and interconnected Indo-Pacific that reflects its values and strategic interests.
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